
Photo courtesy of Target
November 6, 2025
Will Target’s Rebalancing Act Solve its ‘Sloppier’ Stores Problem?
In a recent news report delivered by Melissa Repko for CNBC, it was made clear that Target — as COO and soon-to-be CEO Michael Fiddelke gears up for the next phase in the company’s ongoing turnaround campaign — is looking to improve upon its existing image problem.
“Customers used to hold up Target as an example of how to run large, yet sparkling stores,” Repko wrote.
“Yet in recent years, shopper complaints about sloppier aisles, longer checkout lines, locked-up merchandise and out-of-stock items have dogged the Minneapolis-based retailer, contributing to sagging sales,” she added, before pivoting to detail the red-and-white brand’s latest move.
In a rebalancing act that promises a pivot in its existing online strategy, Target will now designate just some of its stores as fulfillment locations for online orders — meaning that frontline store staff are also charged with picking and packing boxes to ship directly to customer doors — rather than expecting this additional workload from associates in all of its physical locations.
“The company has expanded that plan to 36 markets as of the end of October, more than half of its 60 markets, after a successful pilot in the Chicago area, said Gretchen McCarthy, chief supply chain and logistics officer. It plans to expand that further in 2026,” Repko stated.
Target Seeks To Remove Complexity, Improve In-Store Experience With New Fulfillment Plan
With Fiddelke, in October, having indicated that Target’s “stores as hubs” model had the dual impacts of making the e-comm side of business more cost efficient and light on capital, it also presented challenges as store staff were tasked with far more duties than they had been previously.
“If you’re a store manager now, yes, you’re supporting your in-store guest and you’re also running a fulfillment business that’s gotten pretty big. And I think we’re just now fully appreciating, ‘All right, we’ve got to make sure that we’re doing both really well and it’s more complex than it used to be,’” Fiddelke told CNBC last month, adding that the question of how to trim back some of that complexity was the impetus behind this ongoing move.
The Chicago market served as the test run for the rebalancing, with the 100 stores in the greater Chicago area no longer all being tasked with online order fulfillment — 18 stores stopped these operations entirely, while six increased their workloads. Just five stores, alone, in that region now handle 30% of all ship-to-home volume in the market.
“The store is still very much the hub of everything that we do,” Gretchen McCarthy, chief supply chain and logistics officer, said. “We’re just getting more precise and maybe a little bit more refined in how we’re using all of those stores and our supply chain network.”
The early results have been promising: In stores that no longer engage in picking and packing for online orders, in-store sales have ticked upward, out-of-stocks have shown improvement, and customer surveys reflecting opinions on store cleanliness and the quality of staff interaction improved by 10%. There’s one caveat, however, as McCarthy underscored — these sunny metrics weren’t showing the same level of improvement in locations where frontline staff were still charged with fulfillment tasking.
For his part, despite some analysts’ calls for additional payroll to beef up frontline rosters, Fiddelke seemingly remains focused on improvements to efficiency rather than increased hiring, per CNBC, although the incoming CEO noted that Target was “always looking at what’s the right level of staffing in our store.”
Discussion Questions
Will Target’s notion of rebalancing online fulfillment away from certain locations succeed in improving store standards, and customer perceptions thereof? Why or why not?
Is Target’s apparent reluctance to bolster its frontline roster a wise business move, in your opinion?
Poll
BrainTrust
Neil Saunders
Managing Director, GlobalData
Scott Benedict
Founder & CEO, Benedict Enterprises LLC
Mohamed Amer, PhD
CEO & Strategic Board Advisor, Strategy Doctor
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The main reason some of Target’s stores are so sloppy is because associates have been given more things to do without a corresponding increase in available labor hours. That means basic tasks, like replenishment and recovery, are not attended to. Removing or reducing online fulfilment from some stores will free up time. However, it’s not a silver bullet. Pick-up orders will still add pressure, as will having to facilitate functions like Drive Up. In some locations the withdrawal of overnight stocking and recovery will still cause issues, as will Target’s inability to get a grip on out-of-stocks due to bad buying processes. In other words, this is a step in the right direction but it’s just one of many steps that Target needs to take to get back on track.
This rebalancing is a step in the right direction, but the issues it highlights doesn’t address the larger retail problem that Target has – they’ve lost the basic retail principles of better merchandising with >90% instock. This is a complicated problem to solve, involving Merchants, Operators, Supply Chain, Finance, and many more teams.
Is Target getting 1099’ed for all the free publicity they’re getting? (Granted much of it is anything but positive, but for those in the “any news is good news” school of thought…)
The consensus on Tarjhay seems to be that they have so many problems, (almost) anything will help…if it’s implmented correctly. But that’s really the big “if”, isn’t it? Come back to us when they can show tangible results.
Both this article and Ms. Repko failed to mention that Neil Saunders had some influence in Target’s clean up efforts, but I will. Neil has shared photos of retail sales floors that look more like demolition zones for years. Target is one of them. Macy’s execs took notice of Neil’s X and LinkedIn accounts and has greatly improved the shopping experience. Like they say, a picture IS worth a thousand words.
Clap, clap, clap,clap,clap, clap…
Let’s give credit where credit is due!
Fiddelke’s rebalancing acknowledges the obvious that you can’t run a fulfillment center and a retail store with retail-only labor hours. This is an under-resourced, not under-managed problem. Nevertheless, this optimization just relocates the capacity deficit elsewhere. So, it’s hard not to see this as treating a symptom while ignoring the disease: chronic underinvestment in frontline capacity even as workload complexity exploded. Fiddelke’s reluctance to “bolster the frontline roster” while stores demonstrably improved when work was removed reveals the actual priority: protecting margins over fixing the experience. You can’t engineer your way out of a capacity problem. At some point, better retail requires more investment, not just cleverer allocation of insufficient resources.
Target’s merchandising and maintenance issues, particularly in apparel, have been a problem for years. Target’s actually been getting a pass on it. When shoppers are literally shopping off the floor, it craters Target’s private brand investments and brand partnerships, both of which have always been central to Target’s value proposition, but even more so now as these initiatives are still at the top of Target’s list to drive $15 billion in sales growth by 2030. But what’s the point of creating all these brands if they lose their distinct identities right after they hit the floor? Often, literally.
On a recent retail safari with clients, the Champion brand boutique was front and center as Target’s latest big brand hookup. There were really nice-looking ball caps on rods shooting out of a shelf, but with a tangle of other products thrown on top. Soft, sturdy, logoed fleece was on the floor and wadded up on shelves. There was just no attention to actually maintaining the presentation.
When you’re competing against specialty retailers with armies of associates continually folding and zhuzhing product, setting and forgetting just won’t cut it. On the way out, the self-checkout line was all the way down the aisle again, 26 people deep. What a bummer. Nothing’s changed. There’s no break in the clouds.
The intention behind Target’s decision to designate only a subset of its stores for full online-fulfilment tasks—and relieve the remainder of that burden—is a step in the wrong direction and ultimately functions more like a band-aid than a cure.
According to the article, store locations that shed fulfilment duties saw improvement in in-store sales, cleaner presentation, and a 10 % lift in customer survey scores around cleanliness and staff interaction. However, the move does not address the root causes of the poor store standards: understaffing, overloaded associate duties, broken replenishment and merchandising disciplines, and weaker competitive convenience versus Walmart. Guests still experience locked-up merchandise, out-of-stock items, and aisles that look neglected. In short, shifting the fulfilment burden away from certain locations helps the symptoms (messy stores) but leaves the disease (executional weakness, labour under-investment, compromised convenience) untreated.
On the question of whether Target’s reluctance to significantly bolster its frontline roster is wise, I believe it is not. By focusing on efficiency and redeployment rather than increasing staffing and truly strengthening in-store execution, Target is choosing margin over experience. The article makes clear that the stores with fulfilment loads removed improved only because labour was freed up — yet the chain is not committing to more hires or greater frontline capacity. This puts Target at a disadvantage relative to Walmart and other more deeply staffed players: it makes the proposition less convenient, less reliable, and more prone to guest frustration. For a retailer whose core value includes “a clean, well-stocked store you can visit and leave happy,” this approach is ultimately a misstep.
A classic case of trying to do too much with too little. Driven, as usual, by “cost efficiency”. It must have sounded both simple and brilliant at first. And it worked for a while, right up until the moment it didn’t. And by then, what was supposed to have been cost efficiency had created more problems than it had solved. It became a wickedly complicated combination of problems including under-buying, under-staffing and a whole slew of supply chain problems. I thought Target rose above the mainstream retail performance by over investing. Over investing worked. Under investing didn’t work. Now they’ll have to over invest….again…still…always.