Perspectives on Wal-Mart’s RFID Timeline

By Dan Gilmore, Editor,
Writer, Commentator, SupplyChainDigest
Through a special arrangement,
presented here for discussion is an excerpt of a current article from Supply
Chain Digest.
The recent news that Procter & Gamble
was ending its successful test of putting EPC/RFID tags on promotional
displays going to Wal-Mart with the implied issue being Wal-Mart’s inability
to act on the data to drive better execution of getting displays to the
floor triggered us at Supply Chain Digest to take a look back
on the whole RFID program at Wal-Mart.
It was an interesting review.
You can find a graphic of
that timeline here (Wal-Mart RFID Timeline),
but on RetailWire we just wanted to provide some perspective on
the nearly six year Wal-Mart journey.
Wal-Mart first made its
announcement of a plan to require tagging at the pallet and case level
in June of 2003. That was several months before EPCGlobal as
an organization, taking over the pioneering work of MIT’s auto ID center,
was actually launched.
The initial plan called
for the first “top 100 suppliers” to begin tagging pallets and
cases in June 2005. The scope was unclear at first, but eventually the
requirement was limited just to product being sent to three distribution
centers in Texas. During 2004, eight large suppliers (Gillette, HewlettPackard,
Johnson & Johnson, KimberlyClark, Kraft Foods, Nestlé Purina PetCare,
Procter & Gamble, and Unilever) did some testing with Wal-Mart with
a limited number of SKUs.
In the fall of 2003, a Wal-Mart
executive said all suppliers would be tagging by the end of 2006. That
of course never happened.
Many of the top 100 suppliers
more or less met something close to the requirement for tagging by the
end of January 2005 for the three DCs. The requirement
for the next 200 suppliers, which were scheduled to go live in January
2006, really never materialized.
In October 2005, a Wal-Mart
sponsored research effort by the University of Arkansas said preliminary
data showed RFID tagging reduced store stock outs by 16 percent.
In April 2006, Wal-Mart
CIO Linda Dillman, the public point person for
Wal-Mart’s RFID program, took a new executive role in human resources.
Former supply chain head Rollin Ford became CIO – and took a much
lower profile on RFID.
In February 2007, The
Wall Street Journal wrote a negative article on Wal-Mart’s RFID efforts,
citing internal delays and the low value prop for manufacturers. Wal-Mart
rebutted the thesis, and found a few suppliers that agreed, but at about
the same time Sara Lee’s CIO said the value wasn’t there (yet).
In the fall of 2007, Wal-Mart
announced it was significantly changing its RFID strategy, focusing on
Sam’s Club, promotional displays, and a pilot in category management.
In 2008, the Sam’s Club
tagging program, including the first ever actual compliance penalties,
was announced. In January 2009, the Sam’s Club schedule was pushed out,
and the penalties dramatically reduced; “fines” for lack of tagging
went from $2-3.00 per pallet to 12 cents Wal-Mart’s cost to apply a pallet
tag.
In February 2009, P&G
ended its promotional display efforts.
So, what can we take away
from all this?
- Wal-Mart
clearly overestimated its ability to drive change; - Wal-Mart
confused the public campaign, announcements, etc. with its real operational
goals. It got caught in a sense by its own PR campaign, and overpromised
and underdelivered, when as usual the opposite would have been the better
path; - Slow
but steady often really does win the race.
RFID will come, benefiting
from the lessons of its history.
Discussion Question: What lessons can be
learned from Wal-Mart’s program to bring RFID to retail? Do you agree
that Wal-Mart overestimated its ability to drive change? What’s the next
step for RFID?
Join the Discussion!
14 Comments on "Perspectives on Wal-Mart’s RFID Timeline"
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I agree that RFID will be embraced by Walmart’s vendors sooner or later. There is too much inherent benefit to the technology and too much expense and energy devoted to it (by Walmart in particular) to let the initiative die. This may be a rare case, however, where Walmart needs to do some collaborative cost-sharing with its key vendors until the technology becomes more cost-efficient, rather than putting all the expense burden on their shoulders. (I know…you’re skeptical.) RFID is one of the key elements of collaborative supply chain management in the future.
One lesson is fairly obvious from Wal-Mart’s RFID Timeline, and Procter & Gamble’s reaction that the data was not being used; expectations and implementation didn’t match up. Unfortunately, it appears this was an experiment that wasted time, money, and resources. Too bad, because it’s a technology that if taken to heart, would work well.
In order to be ultimately successful, technology for retail has to have a benefit to the consumer. In this case, it’s hard to make that case. It also has to have a benefit to the ‘people’ that will ultimately implement or use it, again, it’s hard to make that case. If that were the opposite, it would have immediate traction and more than that, it would be implemented and in use.
Simply looking at the survey results, where nearly half responding even here see this as 5 years to never, would indicate to me that this is going nowhere fast.
Determining a positive impact to the consumer and a means to measure it is the only sure way to rapid advancement retail technology. I am not seeing that anywhere in this whole conundrum of RFID.
I agree with Susan. The key fundamentals around implementing RFID have not changed, even though the technology has stabilized and adoption has slowed to a snail’s pace. Companies need to adopt long-term strategies, rather than rushing into RFID simply to comply with mandates. CPG companies should focus on optimizing their current operations and using existing technology infrastructure, while allowing room for growth and the adoption of RFID in the near future.
So did Wal-Mart overestimate its ability to drive change through RFID? Perhaps it was more a case of an overly ambitious timeline. While the spotlight has been shining down on Wal-Mart, we’ve seen an increased focus on closed-loop systems. We are more optimistic about closed-loop environments, as opposed to the market for mandate-related hardware, software, and services. Closed-loop systems give companies a cost-effective entry point to RFID and help them obtain a much quicker ROI, compared with a typical RFID business case focused on compliance issues.
Well said Jamie. The only amplification I can add is at the heart of the real issue. Measurement. If you measure you will manage and plans will be executed. Then if results are less than stellar…we will all know it’s the plan, not the execution of the plan.
This cannot happen without measurement. Measurement using RFID is a looonnnnnggg way off. Even the program run by Walgreens impacts only a small portion of displays and an even smaller portion of the total merchandising effort (displays, new item cut-ins, POG changes and Point of Sale Material.) I know there are better methods, less expensive, less process disruptive either available now–or soon.
At the same time, if no one is going to do anything with the measurement information (i.e. use it to manage) well then….
The Supply Chain Digest Walmart RFID timeline should go back to 1992, when IBM teamed up with Walmart to produce another RFID system. That alliance project was terminated a few years later, because no one could prove a reasonable return on investment. RFID has a long history of project failures, certainly not just at Walmart. The failures are most often financial, not technological.
Can’t–help–self. Must–repeat–dogma….
RFID–no–solution. Just–tool. Pointless–without–in-store–compliance–discipline.
Phew. Glad I got that out of my system. This review of the RFID saga provides a valuable perspective on how even big players sometimes confuse a promising technology with a workable solution.
Point solutions are pointless in the absence of core underlying implementation practices. Most chain grocery and mass stores today cannot comply effectively with planogram, promotion, new item introduction or other merchandising plans because they lack systematic practices, enabling communications and measurement tools to back them up.
There’s no single solution to this, but there is a solution path, and RFID may well be one of the stops along the way. When companies like Walmart begin to share daily data on merchandising implementation performance, issues and compliance rates using portals like Retail Link, the true journey will begin.
Ms. Baird’s comments go to the root of the problem. RFID offers little, if any, advantage over current bar code technologies in the shipping/receiving process, yet that is where RFID was deployed at Wal-Mart. As she points out, RFID can offer benefits only when it can track items at the shelf location. Unfortunately, significant technical barriers, that have been known for years, appear likely to prevent effective RFID tracking in the noisy world of the retail aisle.
It’s unfortunate that, in their quest for another revenue opportunity, so many tech firms and tech advisors ignored the inherent problems with RFID. Retailers that jumped into RFID early are finding that the pie in the sky vision that launched RFID back in the midst of the Internet bubble has become a money pit instead.