January 28, 2026
chrisdorney/Depositphotos.com
Is Amazon’s Exit From Fresh and Go Banners, Pivoting to Whole Foods Market and New Formats, Common Sense?
In a January 27 news piece authored by Amazon staff, the retail giant indicated that it would be shuttering all remaining Amazon Go and Amazon Fresh stores, instead focusing on a singular physical grocery presence via its Whole Foods Market banner in addition to online grocery delivery operations more broadly.
“While we’ve seen encouraging signals in our Amazon-branded physical grocery stores, we haven’t yet created a truly distinctive customer experience with the right economic model needed for large-scale expansion,” the Amazon report read.
“After a careful evaluation of the business and how we can best serve customers, we’ve made the difficult decision to close our Amazon Go and Amazon Fresh physical stores, converting various locations into Whole Foods Market stores. Customers can continue to shop Amazon Fresh online in available areas for fast and convenient delivery,” it continued.
Other notable inclusions within the report:
- Amazon is doubling down on Whole Foods Market: After producing some strong numbers suggesting that Whole Foods Market has been an unequivocal success since its acquisition by Amazon in 2017 — including 40%-plus sales growth and expansion to over 550 locations — the retailer noted that plans to open more than 100 further Whole Foods Market locations over the next five years had been initiated.
- A new format tied to Whole Foods Market is in the cards: Based on the above, Amazon also outlined details tied to a planned new format, Whole Foods Market Daily Shop, a smaller-format store angling to make a splash in the convenience and neighborhood grocery category. “The format—now in five locations—has quickly become part of customers’ daily lives, with shoppers loving how it offers the same Whole Foods Market quality they trust in a convenient, quick-stop location. Based on strong performance, we’ll open five additional Whole Foods Market Daily Shop locations by the end of 2026,” the company detailed.
- Walmart, watch out: Amazon also said it was exploring a supercenter physical retail concept “designed for customers to conveniently shop Amazon’s broad selection and low prices across fresh groceries, household essentials, and general merchandise.” If this sounds like competition for Walmart, itself edging into Amazon’s established e-comm territory with its Marketplace, that’s certainly a logical stance to take.
Aside from the three items detailed above, Amazon also talked up its “Just Walk Out” technology, noting that it had shown value at scale (in operation at more than 360 third-party locations). The retailer indicated that it would be rolling out the tech to its own North American fulfillment centers, 40 of which already incorporate JWO solutions in breakrooms to cut down on checkout delays facing employees.
Tests related to Amazon Grocery, or the store-within-a-store experience as deployed in the Whole Foods Market in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, were also underscored as vital proving grounds for new retail concepts key to Amazon’s continued growth.
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Mark Ryski
Founder, CEO & Author, HeadCount Corporation
Lisa Goller
B2B Content Strategist
Richard Hernandez
Merchant Director
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Discussion Questions
Is Amazon’s stated plan a wise one, in your opinion? Which aspects do you think are common sense business strategies, and which are a bit iffy?
Does Amazon have the ability to seriously compete with Walmart in the supercenter space?
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Amazon tried to make these concepts work. Ultimately, neither proved to be a viable vehicle for expansion: Go because the focus on technology is not what customers want; Fresh because there is no clear point of difference. In a market where people are very habitual, they could not drive switching. So, Amazon is right to move on and to allocate investment to areas where it can bring real points of difference: online (convenience and speed) and via Whole Foods (quality and natural). And let’s not forget, Amazon has a grocery business that rakes in around $150 billion a year, so the idea it is completely failing in the category is nonsense.
Physical retail is far different – and perhaps more challenging – than grocery delivery, which Amazon has excelled at thus far. They appear to be pivoting from 1 format to the next, but how they plan on implementing a competitive advantage remains to be seen.
Amazon can compete in virtually any category it chooses, but that doesn’t mean that they’ll be successful. Amazon is smart to continue in grocery— the ultimate recurring revenue— but it’s also wise to cut the other formats like, GO. JWO may be gaining some traction, but I remain skeptical that it will be financially viable using today’s technology. The move into super large format is very curious and makes clear that Amazon has not given up on physical retail. Also smart.
I think Amzon has the ablity to compete, in the sense that it has a bottomless supply of funds it can draw on, but does that make (the most) sense? As others have noted, running a physical store is a different beast than online, and so far Amazon’s ground-up efforts in that area have been underwhelming. There’s also the obvious – if overlooked – fact that there’re only so many retail sales to go around: Amazon can’t hope for double digit growth forever…even if they do succeed in putting many competitors out-of- business.
I’m not sure that well of money is really bottomless. Layoff, shuttering banners…if it was by other retailer, what would you say? I just don’t know who is putting the pressure on them, but it’s there. Without doubt. This is not normal healthy retail behavior
Ah, but it isn’t (just) any other retailer, is it? It’s Amazon, home of the eternal spin machine that supplies pre-packaged happy talk narratives to lazy editors everywhere.
Amazon is hungry to win in grocery – and not just by selling products to consumers in a category with lean margins. The real money is in selling services to businesses for higher margins.
Amazon Go stores helped Amazon test then offer Just Walk Out to 360 stores with small footprints to efficiently serve customers in a rush.
Amazon Fresh stores helped Amazon test its Amazon Dash Cart, which it could offer to more grocers beyond Price Chopper.
Now the new supercenter may act in part as a real-world lab for Amazon to test proprietary tech to help big box retailers stay efficient and competitive.
Amazon’s grocery plays attract CPG giants to advertise across its retail media network.
Also, as the K-shaped economy makes retail bifurcation more pronounced, it makes sense for Amazon to expand Whole Food stores to reach discerning, upscale shoppers. (And sell ads to non-endemic brands that target the luxury crowd.)
In my seldom-humble opinion, Amazon could easily divest of Whole Foods, which can’t be a huge money maker, and stick to what it knows best; online sales…of anything.
What’s lost in all of this is the contradiction in Amazon’s grocery strategy. On the one hand they say they are going to focus on the Whole Foods brand as their meal ticket — if you will — for their food business but then they go ahead and announce a giant Amazon store for next year in Chicago that will be all about groceries. This doesn’t make any sense at all and even if you give the company credit for testing and experimenting, it’s been 15 years and they still have come up with a physical store strategy that makes sense. These latest developments are only more of the same.
The demise of Amazon Fresh is no surprise: it was the only grocery concept where associates competed with customers for product. The smaller-format neighborhood store sounds like a winner…think of all the communities that would love to have one.
Amazon is perfectly positioned to better penetrate the food/grocery industry and can scale into the big box segment. I question whether they are going after Walmart (at everyday low prices) or preparing for a Prime Club model like a Costco. Whole Foods is a natural alternative to convenience stores and can provide a strong competitor to neighborhood stores that require smaller footprints–perhaps offering pharamcy and other in store services (CVS meets a much better 7-11). Amazon, however, will need to build up their brick and mortar team. As a digital first brand and technology company, they need to beef-up their retail strength.
Amazon Fresh never really embraced or communicated an all-important and compelling value proposition needed to take marketshare away from both price, middle, or quality formats. In the end it was a tech experience which happened to sell groceries. So Amazon’s pivot to add or grow complementary experiences within the successful Whole Foods brand, and test launching the superstore will play more to their strengths. Walmart has a gigantic lead over Amazon in physical superstore success, but Amazon has data and movement on millions of products and online consumer behavior it can and will test.
I think Amazon’s stated plan to shift its physical store strategy, including dialing back deeper investment in the Whole Foods footprint as currently configured, makes strategic sense when viewed through a long-term experimentation lens. The trade press has a tendency to read store openings and closings as definitive judgments on a brand’s physical retail trajectory, but test formats are precisely that: experiments. Retail history is full of concepts that didn’t scale in their original form but delivered insights that powered future success. Walmart’s Hypermart USA is a classic example — the format ultimately failed, but the lessons learned informed the development of the Walmart Supercenter, one of the most enduring and dominant formats in U.S. retail history. Amazon’s willingness to iterate, optimize, and even pull back when something isn’t performing as expected doesn’t signal retreat as much as it signals data-driven refinement of their omnichannel strategy.
Within that context, many aspects of Amazon’s plan feel like common-sense business strategies: focusing capital and attention on what’s demonstrably working (e.g., varied fulfillment hubs, tech-enabled convenience formats, click-and-collect synergies) rather than spreading investment across competing store formats that may not deliver sufficient ROI. Scaling physical retail is expensive, and consumers ultimately vote with their wallets — so it’s prudent to test, learn, and evolve rather than cling to concepts that underperform. Where the plan could feel iffy is if Amazon abandons physical retail entirely without a clear bridge between digital engagement and real-world utility; brick-and-mortar still matters for groceries, returns, immediacy, and brand salience, and scaling back too far could leave gaps competitors are happy to fill.
As for serious competition with Walmart in the supercenter space, it’s worth remembering that Amazon already competes with Walmart on many fronts — from fast delivery and pricing to broad assortments and digital convenience — without needing to replicate the traditional supercenter box. Walmart’s physical footprint and fulfillment infrastructure give it a structural advantage in big-basket, everyday needs — particularly grocery — that Amazon has only scratched at through Whole Foods and Fresh expansions. If Amazon wants to compete directly in the supercenter mold, it will require massive investment and a value proposition that consistently draws consumers to make in-person trips. But it’s equally plausible that Amazon will pursue a different interpretation of “supercenter” — one that blends physical touchpoints with digital ubiquity, smaller footprint micro-fulfillment nodes, and experiential attractions that align with how today’s consumers actually shop.
Ultimately, I’m cautiously optimistic that both Walmart and Amazon will find sustainable paths forward, even as they iterate on their physical formats. The real concern isn’t whether these two behemoths will figure it out — they have the scale, data, and talent to do so — but whether other, weaker retailers, who lack the luxury of testing and learning, can survive. Those organizations are often fighting just to keep the doors open, with limited ability to innovate, refine, or reposition. In a market where experimentation is increasingly essential, the divide between the “test and refine” players and the “protect the status quo” survivors is growing wider — and that’s the competitor landscape that ultimately matters most.
Setting aside Amazon’s pullback from their Fresh and Go banners, I give them credit for a relentless commitment to developing and piloting new retail concepts. The company is steadfast and patient in allowing new business models to prove their viability, though equally quick to pivot when it is time to do so.
Unfortunately, they do not have a solid brick and mortar grocery strategy. The idea is there, but the execution and getting solid industry subject matter experts in fresh, dry grocery, etc has been weak. I just don’t think Whole Foods is the answer, They could have purchased someone like a Target that had a so-so grocery strategy and built up on that. They face a steep hill and boatloads of money trying to find the secret sauce in the brick and mortar grocery world . Good luck.
This shows that even companies with seemingly bottomless resources don’t always succeed in everything they attempt. And let’s remember, Whole Foods was an acquisition. Did Amazon learn from these attempts – yes – but in the end, grocery isn’t easy.
Strategically and operationally, a Super Center sounds like a bridge too far. Whole Foods has a meaning and position in shoppers’ minds. An expansion away from the Whole Foods idea is confusing for customers and for store operations.
While I give Amazon credit for making Whole Foods work, I was skeptical then and I jave been impressed. But before concluding that they’re ready for more physical retail, I have to ask: what have they actually learned about Brick and Mortar?
The issues that led to their expensive withdrawal from Fresh are still relevant and, from my perspective, haven’t been solved. Success in physical retail requires more than just capital and a logo swap; it requires mastery of three pillars that Amazon has yet to prove:
Differentiation: Why should a customer choose an Amazon-run store over a local favorite or a specialized incumbent? Tech isn’t a compelling value prop.Store Operations at Scale: Managing a handful of premium locations is not the same as managing a massive, national footprint of high-volume stores.Assortment Curation: Amazon’s “infinite shelf” philosophy doesn’t translate to the physical four walls, where every square inch of shelf space has to earn its keep. Given their approach of being all things to all people, assortment discipline is difficult for the most sophisticated store-focused retailer.
Amazon’s merchant team will have their work cut out for them as they grow and expand. Until they solve these issues, Walmart’s advantage in the store execution space seems safe.
The decision to drop the Amazon Fresh and Go concepts, which sounds like it’s being rolled into Whole Foods, is a decision to make the complicated simple. It makes sense to consolidate the best of what Fresh and Go offer.
As for competing with Walmart, this is a new “physical” concept for Amazon, and I’m sure they won’t just rush into it and build throughout the US and beyond. They will test, and test again. The supercenter space makes sense. It’s big enough to reflect the most popular Amazon options. And the data Amazon collects as the largest online retailer will help it make smart decisions about which merchandise will sell in physical stores.
Amazon followed the rule of “buy where you are weak” when it acquired Whole Foods. Unfortunately, it violated the corollary of “build where you are strong” with Amazon Go & Amazon Fresh retail stores. Its strengths are in technology & supply chain, not non-traditional food retailing.
Amazon’s decision to shutter its Fresh and Go physical stores is a strategic pivot aimed at consolidating around profitable assets and refocusing resources for the future of AI-driven commerce. The move sacrifices failed experiments to better compete in an evolving retail landscape. Neither the Fresh nor Go banners achieved a viable economic model or a distinctive customer experience necessary for large-scale expansion while doubling down on the successful Whole Foods Market banner and robust online grocery delivery operations.
This pivot positions Amazon to adapt to the rise of agentic commerce while maintaining its proprietary control. By exiting physical formats that struggled with differentiation, Amazon reinforces its “walled garden” approach. It continues to integrate AI within its owned ecosystem to control the entire customer journey and protect valuable data from third-party agents. The future physical presence (Whole Foods, new massive supercenters) serves less as a traditional store and more as a multi-purpose hub for fulfillment, showcasing technology, and brand reinforcement in a world where AI agents handle routine purchases.
The competitive battle with Walmart is best viewed as Amazon’s data-driven flexibility against Walmart’s established physical infrastructure and growing interoperability strategy in the increasingly autonomous AI commerce space.
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Amazon tried to make these concepts work. Ultimately, neither proved to be a viable vehicle for expansion: Go because the focus on technology is not what customers want; Fresh because there is no clear point of difference. In a market where people are very habitual, they could not drive switching. So, Amazon is right to move on and to allocate investment to areas where it can bring real points of difference: online (convenience and speed) and via Whole Foods (quality and natural). And let’s not forget, Amazon has a grocery business that rakes in around $150 billion a year, so the idea it is completely failing in the category is nonsense.
Physical retail is far different – and perhaps more challenging – than grocery delivery, which Amazon has excelled at thus far. They appear to be pivoting from 1 format to the next, but how they plan on implementing a competitive advantage remains to be seen.
Amazon can compete in virtually any category it chooses, but that doesn’t mean that they’ll be successful. Amazon is smart to continue in grocery— the ultimate recurring revenue— but it’s also wise to cut the other formats like, GO. JWO may be gaining some traction, but I remain skeptical that it will be financially viable using today’s technology. The move into super large format is very curious and makes clear that Amazon has not given up on physical retail. Also smart.
I think Amzon has the ablity to compete, in the sense that it has a bottomless supply of funds it can draw on, but does that make (the most) sense? As others have noted, running a physical store is a different beast than online, and so far Amazon’s ground-up efforts in that area have been underwhelming. There’s also the obvious – if overlooked – fact that there’re only so many retail sales to go around: Amazon can’t hope for double digit growth forever…even if they do succeed in putting many competitors out-of- business.
I’m not sure that well of money is really bottomless. Layoff, shuttering banners…if it was by other retailer, what would you say? I just don’t know who is putting the pressure on them, but it’s there. Without doubt. This is not normal healthy retail behavior
Ah, but it isn’t (just) any other retailer, is it? It’s Amazon, home of the eternal spin machine that supplies pre-packaged happy talk narratives to lazy editors everywhere.
Amazon is hungry to win in grocery – and not just by selling products to consumers in a category with lean margins. The real money is in selling services to businesses for higher margins.
Amazon Go stores helped Amazon test then offer Just Walk Out to 360 stores with small footprints to efficiently serve customers in a rush.
Amazon Fresh stores helped Amazon test its Amazon Dash Cart, which it could offer to more grocers beyond Price Chopper.
Now the new supercenter may act in part as a real-world lab for Amazon to test proprietary tech to help big box retailers stay efficient and competitive.
Amazon’s grocery plays attract CPG giants to advertise across its retail media network.
Also, as the K-shaped economy makes retail bifurcation more pronounced, it makes sense for Amazon to expand Whole Food stores to reach discerning, upscale shoppers. (And sell ads to non-endemic brands that target the luxury crowd.)
In my seldom-humble opinion, Amazon could easily divest of Whole Foods, which can’t be a huge money maker, and stick to what it knows best; online sales…of anything.
What’s lost in all of this is the contradiction in Amazon’s grocery strategy. On the one hand they say they are going to focus on the Whole Foods brand as their meal ticket — if you will — for their food business but then they go ahead and announce a giant Amazon store for next year in Chicago that will be all about groceries. This doesn’t make any sense at all and even if you give the company credit for testing and experimenting, it’s been 15 years and they still have come up with a physical store strategy that makes sense. These latest developments are only more of the same.
The demise of Amazon Fresh is no surprise: it was the only grocery concept where associates competed with customers for product. The smaller-format neighborhood store sounds like a winner…think of all the communities that would love to have one.
Amazon is perfectly positioned to better penetrate the food/grocery industry and can scale into the big box segment. I question whether they are going after Walmart (at everyday low prices) or preparing for a Prime Club model like a Costco. Whole Foods is a natural alternative to convenience stores and can provide a strong competitor to neighborhood stores that require smaller footprints–perhaps offering pharamcy and other in store services (CVS meets a much better 7-11). Amazon, however, will need to build up their brick and mortar team. As a digital first brand and technology company, they need to beef-up their retail strength.
Amazon Fresh never really embraced or communicated an all-important and compelling value proposition needed to take marketshare away from both price, middle, or quality formats. In the end it was a tech experience which happened to sell groceries. So Amazon’s pivot to add or grow complementary experiences within the successful Whole Foods brand, and test launching the superstore will play more to their strengths. Walmart has a gigantic lead over Amazon in physical superstore success, but Amazon has data and movement on millions of products and online consumer behavior it can and will test.
I think Amazon’s stated plan to shift its physical store strategy, including dialing back deeper investment in the Whole Foods footprint as currently configured, makes strategic sense when viewed through a long-term experimentation lens. The trade press has a tendency to read store openings and closings as definitive judgments on a brand’s physical retail trajectory, but test formats are precisely that: experiments. Retail history is full of concepts that didn’t scale in their original form but delivered insights that powered future success. Walmart’s Hypermart USA is a classic example — the format ultimately failed, but the lessons learned informed the development of the Walmart Supercenter, one of the most enduring and dominant formats in U.S. retail history. Amazon’s willingness to iterate, optimize, and even pull back when something isn’t performing as expected doesn’t signal retreat as much as it signals data-driven refinement of their omnichannel strategy.
Within that context, many aspects of Amazon’s plan feel like common-sense business strategies: focusing capital and attention on what’s demonstrably working (e.g., varied fulfillment hubs, tech-enabled convenience formats, click-and-collect synergies) rather than spreading investment across competing store formats that may not deliver sufficient ROI. Scaling physical retail is expensive, and consumers ultimately vote with their wallets — so it’s prudent to test, learn, and evolve rather than cling to concepts that underperform. Where the plan could feel iffy is if Amazon abandons physical retail entirely without a clear bridge between digital engagement and real-world utility; brick-and-mortar still matters for groceries, returns, immediacy, and brand salience, and scaling back too far could leave gaps competitors are happy to fill.
As for serious competition with Walmart in the supercenter space, it’s worth remembering that Amazon already competes with Walmart on many fronts — from fast delivery and pricing to broad assortments and digital convenience — without needing to replicate the traditional supercenter box. Walmart’s physical footprint and fulfillment infrastructure give it a structural advantage in big-basket, everyday needs — particularly grocery — that Amazon has only scratched at through Whole Foods and Fresh expansions. If Amazon wants to compete directly in the supercenter mold, it will require massive investment and a value proposition that consistently draws consumers to make in-person trips. But it’s equally plausible that Amazon will pursue a different interpretation of “supercenter” — one that blends physical touchpoints with digital ubiquity, smaller footprint micro-fulfillment nodes, and experiential attractions that align with how today’s consumers actually shop.
Ultimately, I’m cautiously optimistic that both Walmart and Amazon will find sustainable paths forward, even as they iterate on their physical formats. The real concern isn’t whether these two behemoths will figure it out — they have the scale, data, and talent to do so — but whether other, weaker retailers, who lack the luxury of testing and learning, can survive. Those organizations are often fighting just to keep the doors open, with limited ability to innovate, refine, or reposition. In a market where experimentation is increasingly essential, the divide between the “test and refine” players and the “protect the status quo” survivors is growing wider — and that’s the competitor landscape that ultimately matters most.
Setting aside Amazon’s pullback from their Fresh and Go banners, I give them credit for a relentless commitment to developing and piloting new retail concepts. The company is steadfast and patient in allowing new business models to prove their viability, though equally quick to pivot when it is time to do so.
Unfortunately, they do not have a solid brick and mortar grocery strategy. The idea is there, but the execution and getting solid industry subject matter experts in fresh, dry grocery, etc has been weak. I just don’t think Whole Foods is the answer, They could have purchased someone like a Target that had a so-so grocery strategy and built up on that. They face a steep hill and boatloads of money trying to find the secret sauce in the brick and mortar grocery world . Good luck.
This shows that even companies with seemingly bottomless resources don’t always succeed in everything they attempt. And let’s remember, Whole Foods was an acquisition. Did Amazon learn from these attempts – yes – but in the end, grocery isn’t easy.
Strategically and operationally, a Super Center sounds like a bridge too far. Whole Foods has a meaning and position in shoppers’ minds. An expansion away from the Whole Foods idea is confusing for customers and for store operations.
While I give Amazon credit for making Whole Foods work, I was skeptical then and I jave been impressed. But before concluding that they’re ready for more physical retail, I have to ask: what have they actually learned about Brick and Mortar?
The issues that led to their expensive withdrawal from Fresh are still relevant and, from my perspective, haven’t been solved. Success in physical retail requires more than just capital and a logo swap; it requires mastery of three pillars that Amazon has yet to prove:
Differentiation: Why should a customer choose an Amazon-run store over a local favorite or a specialized incumbent? Tech isn’t a compelling value prop.Store Operations at Scale: Managing a handful of premium locations is not the same as managing a massive, national footprint of high-volume stores.Assortment Curation: Amazon’s “infinite shelf” philosophy doesn’t translate to the physical four walls, where every square inch of shelf space has to earn its keep. Given their approach of being all things to all people, assortment discipline is difficult for the most sophisticated store-focused retailer.
Amazon’s merchant team will have their work cut out for them as they grow and expand. Until they solve these issues, Walmart’s advantage in the store execution space seems safe.
The decision to drop the Amazon Fresh and Go concepts, which sounds like it’s being rolled into Whole Foods, is a decision to make the complicated simple. It makes sense to consolidate the best of what Fresh and Go offer.
As for competing with Walmart, this is a new “physical” concept for Amazon, and I’m sure they won’t just rush into it and build throughout the US and beyond. They will test, and test again. The supercenter space makes sense. It’s big enough to reflect the most popular Amazon options. And the data Amazon collects as the largest online retailer will help it make smart decisions about which merchandise will sell in physical stores.
Amazon followed the rule of “buy where you are weak” when it acquired Whole Foods. Unfortunately, it violated the corollary of “build where you are strong” with Amazon Go & Amazon Fresh retail stores. Its strengths are in technology & supply chain, not non-traditional food retailing.
Amazon’s decision to shutter its Fresh and Go physical stores is a strategic pivot aimed at consolidating around profitable assets and refocusing resources for the future of AI-driven commerce. The move sacrifices failed experiments to better compete in an evolving retail landscape. Neither the Fresh nor Go banners achieved a viable economic model or a distinctive customer experience necessary for large-scale expansion while doubling down on the successful Whole Foods Market banner and robust online grocery delivery operations.
This pivot positions Amazon to adapt to the rise of agentic commerce while maintaining its proprietary control. By exiting physical formats that struggled with differentiation, Amazon reinforces its “walled garden” approach. It continues to integrate AI within its owned ecosystem to control the entire customer journey and protect valuable data from third-party agents. The future physical presence (Whole Foods, new massive supercenters) serves less as a traditional store and more as a multi-purpose hub for fulfillment, showcasing technology, and brand reinforcement in a world where AI agents handle routine purchases.
The competitive battle with Walmart is best viewed as Amazon’s data-driven flexibility against Walmart’s established physical infrastructure and growing interoperability strategy in the increasingly autonomous AI commerce space.